Austen-Smith and Banks (Journal of Economic Theory, 2000) study how money burning can expand the set of pure cheap talk equilibria of Crawford and Sobel (Econometrica, 1982). I identify an error in the main Theorem of Austen-Smith and Banks, and provide a variant that preserves some of the important implications. I also prove that cheap talk can be influential with money burning if and only if it can be influential without money burning. This strengthens a result of Austen-Smith and Banks, but uncovers other errors in their analysis. Finally, an open conjecture of theirs is proved correct.
Introduction
In an important paper on signaling with multiple instruments, Austen-Smith and Banks [2, hereafter ASB] augment the seminal cheap talk model of Crawford and Sobel [3, hereafter CS] by allowing the Sender to send not only costless messages, but also choose from a set of purely dissipative signals, i.e. "burn money". ASB's contribution is twofold: first, to show that money burning by itself can be an effective signaling instrument in the CS setting; second, to study how money burning can interact with and influence the informativeness of cheap talk messages.
This note accomplishes three tasks:
1. Section 3 identifies an error in Theorem 1 of ASB that asserts the existence of particular equilibria with money burning in relation to equilibria of CS. I provide a variant of the Theorem, which preserves some of the main implications, but not all of them.
2. Section 4 derives a result showing that money burning cannot expand the set of environments in which cheap talk is credible, except perhaps in knife-edged cases.
This considerably strengthens Theorem 2 in ASB, but also shows that ASB's (p. 13) claims following that Theorem are incorrect. In particular, not only is the example reported in ASB (p. 13) erroneous, 1 but moreover, the result here implies that no such generic example exists. show that the conjecture is in fact correct and thereby establish a continuity result on the equilibrium correspondence at b = 0.
1 Footnote 8 in this note points out exactly where their example fails.
Before turning to the formalities, I should mention that the ASB model can be considered as a limit of the discriminatory signaling model studied in Kartik [4] . 2 An earlier, extended version of this note [5] contains a detailed comparison of the similarities and differences, and also discusses issues pertaining to refinement of equilibria in the ASB model.
Preliminaries
To preserve continuity of exposition, I follow ASB's notation closely; the reader should consult their paper for a discussion of the model. A Sender, S, is privately informed about a variable, t ∈ [0, 1] (his type) which is drawn from a distribution with density h, h(t) > 0 for all t. S sends a signal to the Receiver, R, who observes the signal and then takes an action a ∈ R. Let σ : [0, 1] → M × R + be the Sender's (pure) strategy that consists of a cheap talk message m ∈ M , where M is any uncountable space, and a burned money component b ∈ R + , for every type t ∈ [0, 1]. Let α : M ×R + → R + be the Receiver's (pure) strategy that consists of an action a ∈ R for every (m, b) pair. The Receiver's beliefs are denoted by the cdf G(·|m, b). Over triplets (a, b, t), the Receiver's preferences are u R (a, t) and the Sender's preferences are u S (a, t) − b where u S and u R satisfy the CS assumptions. 3 The utility maximizing actions given t are denoted y i (t) ≡ arg max a u i (a, t) for each i ∈ {S, R}; it is assumed that for all t, y R (t) < y S (t). For
As shorthand, let y(t) ≡ y(t, t).
In what follows, I use two concepts from CS. First, recall the idea of a solution to the standard arbitrage condition.
2 By definition, money burning is non-discriminatory in the sense that its cost does not vary with the Sender's private information or type; this is in contrast to discriminatory signaling where the cost of using a particular signal varies with the Sender's type.
3 That is, for each i ∈ {S, R}, u 
is a forward (resp. backward) solution to (A) if s 1 > s 0 (resp. s 1 < s 0 ).
Next, CS (p. 1444) introduced a condition on the product space of preferences and distribution of private information that ensures the difference equation solutions to the above arbitrage condition satisfy a "regularity" property. What this says is that if we start at a given point, the solutions to (A) must all move up or down together.
Throughout, the term equilibrium refers to a sequential equilibrium, which is equivalent to perfect Bayesian equilibrium in signaling games such as this one.
Squeezing in Separating Segments
ASB (Theorem 1, p. 7) assert the following.
ASB Theorem. Let (σ, α) be a CS equilibrium with supporting partition t 0 ≡ 0, t 1 , . . . , t N ≡ 1 .
Then for allt ≤ t 1 , there exists a partition
where b(t) is a strictly increasing function. 4
4 ASB also pin down the function b(t), which I do not include here for brevity.
The Problem
ASB's proof proceeds in two steps. In the first, they start by picking anyt < t 1 
ASB claim that fixing s and setting V ≡ 0 yields their Eq. (6) through implicit differenti-
But this is wrong: it ignores the indirect effect of s on V through the change of y(s , s) and y(s, t). To see this, observe that totally differentiating V with respect to s and t (holding s fixed) yields
and therefore the correct formula is
For ASB's claim to go through, it would have to be that the Right Hand Side (RHS) of Eq.
(6*) is positive. As they argue, the first term indeed is: both numerator and denominator of the fraction are negative. However, the second term in (6*)-which is missing in (6)-is negative. To see this, first note that the denominator is negative, just as in the first term. In
Hence the numerator is positive, whereby the whole second term is negative. Accordingly, one cannot in general sign the RHS of (6*), leading to a failure of the argument of ASB.
There is at least one explicit conclusion that ASB draw from their Theorem that may not be correct. ASB (p. 11) say that their result "implies that a sufficient condition for there to exist equilibria exhibiting both influential cheap talk and influential costly signals is that there exist influential CS equilibria." Given the error, it is an open question whether this is true when Condition M does not hold. A corollary to Theorem 1 below is that a sufficient condition is that there exists a CS equilibrium with three influential messages. 5 show that "we can squeeze in separating segments at the far end of any CS partition." (p.
A Correct Variant
7, their emphasis) Their Theorem however claimed more: not only can we squeeze in a separating segment at the far end of a CS partition, but moreover, we can squeeze it in while maintaining the same number of influential cheap talk messages. It is here that one runs into difficulty. Instead, if we are satisfied with squeezing in separation at the cost of reducing the number of influential cheap talk messages by one, this can be done. Formally,
Theorem 1. Let there be a CS equilibrium with supporting partition
5 A precise definition of influential messages is postponed to Section 4.
6 In most applications of CS, Condition M is typically satisfied. For example, it holds in the widely-used "uniform quadratic" setting where the prior is uniform and utilities are quadratic loss functions.
7 See Theorem 2 in CS for sufficient conditions on primitives that imply Condition M.
Then there exists an equilibrium (σ, α) such that
where b(t) is a strictly increasing function.
The proof is relegated to the Appendix since the logic is similar to that of ASB's Theorem 1. This modification of the ASB Theorem preserves the essence of their result. In particular, it immediately implies that full revelation is an equilibrium outcome.
Corollary 1. There is an equilibrium (σ, α) such that for all t, α(σ(t)) = y(t).
Proof. Apply Theorem 1 to a CS "babbling" equilibrium, i.e. a CS equilibrium with sup-
It should be noted that this Corollary is weaker than ASB's (p. 11) Corollary 1, which is correct despite the error in their Theorem 1.
Can Money Burning Make Cheap Talk Influential?
Following ASB, say that an equilibrium has influential cheap talk if a particular level of money burning can elicit multiple actions in equilibrium through distinct accompanying cheap talk messages.
Definition 2. An equilibrium (σ, α) has influential cheap talk if there exist t and t such that m(t) = m(t ), b(t) = b(t ), and α(σ(t)) = α(σ(t )).
Similarly, a CS equilibrium is said to be influential if at least two different Receiver actions are played on the equilibrium path. 
Lemma 1. If there is an equilibrium with influential cheap talk, then there exists a strictly increasing sequence, t 1 , t 2 , t 3 , that satisfies (A).
Proof. Suppose that (σ, α) is an equilibrium with influential cheap talk. Then there exist t , 
t , m , m , and b such that σ (t ) = (m , b), σ (t ) = (m , b), and α (σ (t )) < α (σ (t )). Let
a i ≡ α (σ (t )), a k ≡ α (σ (t )), and a j ≡ inf a>a i {a : a ∈ t∈[0,1] α(σ(t))}. For l = i, j, k, let t l ≡ inf{t : α(σ(t)) = a l } and t l+1 ≡ sup{t : α(σ(t)) = a l }. By Lemma 1 of ASB, t i < t i+1 ≤ t j ≤ t j+1 ≤ t k < t k+1 ,
So suppose t i+1 < t k . If b(·) is non-decreasing on (t i , t k+1 ), then b(t) = b for all
t ∈ (t i , t k+1 ), in which case t j = t i+1 , and we are done because t i , t i+1 , t j+1 satisfies (A).
8 The reason it is not an equilibrium is that all types in [0.15, 0.2) would strictly prefer to deviate from the prescribed strategy and play σ(0.2) instead. This is because type 0.15's ideal action is 0.15+0.1157 = 0.2657 which is closer to α(σ(0.2)) = 0.2889 than α(σ(0.15)) = 0.1739.
9 A working paper version of ASB [1] contained this result for the "uniform quadratic" special case.
It remains to consider t i+1 < t k and b(·) decreasing somewhere on (t i , t k+1 ). By
Lemma 1 of ASB, there exists some t n ∈ (t i , t k+1 ) such that b(·) is discontinuous at t n , and
. It is straightforward that there must be some t > t n such that b(·) is pooling on (t n , t) -if not, for small enough ε > 0, a type t n − ε has a profitable deviation to σ(t n + ε). Let a n ≡ min a>y(tn) {a : a ∈ t∈ [0, 1] α(σ(t))}, t n+1 ≡ sup{t : α(σ(t)) = a n }, and (m n , b n ) ≡ σ(t) for any t ∈ (t n , t n+1 ). There are two cases:
is pooling on (t n − δ, t n ).
(i) It is straightforward to verify that the following incentive compatibility condition must hold:
By continuity, it follows that for some t n−1 < t n , and ε > 0 such that
, and consequently,
By continuity, there exists somet ∈ (t n , t n+1 ) such that u S (y (t n−1 , t n ) , t n ) = u S y t n ,t , t n , and consequently, t n ,t, t n+1 satisfies (A).
(ii) Let a n−1 ≡ max a<y(tn) {a : a ∈ t∈ [0, 1] α(σ(t))}, and t n−1 ≡ inf{t : α(σ(t)) = a n−1 }.
Then, the following incentive compatibility condition must hold:
t , t n , and consequently, t n ,t, t n+1 satisfies (A).
The next Lemma says that generically, a sufficient condition for the existence of an influential CS equilibrium is that there exist some non-trivial forward solution to (A). 10 When Condition M does hold, it is well-known that the necessary and sufficient condition for influential CS equilibria is that y(0) < y(0, 1).
11 Recall that a sequence s0, s1, . . . , sN is a backward solution to (A) if it solves (A) and s1 < s0.
Continuity of the Equilibrium Correspondence
At the end of their paper, ASB (p. 15) write: 
The proof follows from minor modifications of Lemma 2 in Kartik [4] ; it is included in the Appendix for completeness.
Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1. Construct the equilibrium as follows. Pick a set of N distinct mes-
where 12 There are two details to note. First, supporting partitions are always defined so that adjacent to any segment of separation are segments of pooling; i.e. each segment of full separation is "maximal". Second, unlike in CS, the partition supporting an equilibrium with b > 0 may have (countably) infinite elements. However, above s, there are are only a finite number of elements.
13 This follows the approach of ASB.
For all types t ∈ (t N −1 , 1], set m(t) = m N and b(t) following ASB to keep each type just indifferent between revealing itself and mimicking a marginally higher type, i.e.
The Receiver's response for any signal on the equilibrium path is given by α(m i , 0) = that if for all b sufficiently small, every equilibrium partition has s 1 (b) arbitrarily close to some CS partition first segment boundary t 1 , the Theorem is true.
(σ(t)) ≤ y(t,t). For typet not to imitate (i.e. pool with)t requires u S (y(t),t) − u S (y(t,t),t) ≤ b(t) − b(t). However, the Right Hand
14 Since σ(0) is an on-the-equilibrium path signal, α(σ(0)) has already been defined.
So suppose towards contradiction that this is not the case. Then there exists a sequence But this is a contradiction with the requirement for an equilibrium partition.
